Gobierno de la ciudad de Buenos Aires

Hospital Neuropsiquiátrico "Dr. José Tiburcio Borda"

Laboratorio de Investigaciones Electroneurobiológicas

y Revista

Electroneurobiología

ISSN: ONLINE 1850-1826 - PRINT 0328-0446

In History of Ideas, Constructivist Pedagogy Stems from German Idealism

by

Stefan Schweizer

Landhausstraße 153, 70188 Stuttgart

stef.schweizer[at]gmx.de

Electroneurobiología 2007; 15 (4), pp. 63-95; URL http://electroneubio.secyt.gov.ar/index2.htm

Copyright © September 2007 Electroneurobiología. Diese Forschungsarbeit ist öffentlich zugänglich. Die treue Reproduktion und die Verbreitung durch Medien ist nur unter folgenden Bedingungen gestattet: Wiedergabe dieses Absatzes sowie Angabe der kompletten Referenz bei Veröffentlichung, inklusive der originalen Internetadresse (URL, siehe oben). / Este texto es un artículo de acceso público; su copia exacta y redistribución por cualquier medio están permitidas bajo la condición de conservar esta noticia y la referencia completa a su publicación incluyendo la URL (ver arriba). / This is an Open Access article: verbatim copying and redistribution of this article are permitted in all media for any purpose, provided this notice is preserved along with the article's full citation and URL (above).

Accepted: 21 September 2007

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ABSTRACT: This essay starts with the thesis that major parts of constructivist theory have found a cozy dwelling in contemporary pedagogical-didactical discourse. Recent policy reforms in the German education sector are an example thereof. Nevertheless, theories of constructivism are not always apparent as such. Too often, when an author openly refers to constructivism his or her ideas are dismissed. This owes to the fact that, in general, history of science and theory of science have not yet thought over constructivism and autopoiesis deeply enough. A further problem is that the radicalism of constructivism often evokes the idea of arbitrariness.

The present essay tries to fill this gap in scientific discourse. It also contributes to the scientific, historical-genetic systematisation of paradigms. As the theoretical source of constructivist theory, German Idealism – for example, the works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich W. J. Schelling – is identified. Schmidt and von Glasersfeld later on contributed further specifications. Still older roots, digging in Aristotelean notions, have been pointed out by Mario Crocco and Colin Dougall for the theory of autopoiesis composed by neurobiologists Maturana and Varela, who were born in a culture partly shaped by four centuries of Aristotelean, Jesuit schooling; thus far, however, the present writer has not yet carried his research program onto the study of such roots. Autopoiesis theory, which basically dovetails and complements the constructivist paradigm, illustrates the implications of a theory of science as regards the theory of self-organisation.

After these steps of fundamental scientific reflection, it is possible to discuss and assess the merits of a pedagogy and a didactics inspired by constructivism: in the arrived-to scenario, the outcome of a constructivist pedagogy can be systematically derived from the theoretical framework. Many consequences of constructivism are nowadays widespread in the academic community concerned with pedagogy and didactics. The main feature of constructivist pedagogy and didactics is the focus on the student. Students are considered autopoietically closed systems and structural-selective acting systems that are only able to act on their own motivation and are incapable to respond to external motives. Therefore self-study, partner- or groupwork is viewed as the ideal means of successful education.

·

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Dieser Aufsatz beginnt mit der These, dass wesentliche Teile der konstruktivistischen Theorie im zeitgenössischen pädagogisch-didaktischen Diskurs implizit fest verankert sind. Neuere politische Reformen im deutschen Erziehungsbereich stellen dafür ein Beispiel dar. Nichtsdestoweniger sind Theorien des Konstruktivismus nicht immer offensichtlich als solche gekennzeichnet. Auch wird oft, wenn sich ein/e Autor/in auf den Konstruktivismus bezieht, von seinen oder ihren Ideen Abschied genommen. Dies beruht auf der Tatsache, dass im Allgemeinen die Geschichte und Theorie der Wissenschaft noch nicht genug über die wissenschaftshistorische und –theoretische Fundierung des Konstruktivismus und der Autopoiese reflektiert hat. Ein weiteres Problem besteht darin, dass der Radikalismus des Konstruktivismus oft die Idee der Willkürlichkeit hervorruft.

Der gegenwärtige Aufsatz versucht diese Lücken im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs zu schließen. Er trägt auch zu der wissenschaftlichen, geschichtlich begründeten Systematisierung von Paradigmen bei. Als die theoretische Quelle der konstruktivistischen Theorie wird Deutscher Idealismus – zum Beispiel die Werke von Johann Gottlieb Fichte und Friedrich W. J. Schelling – bestimmt. Schmidt und von Glasersfeld trugen später weitere Entwürfe bei. Auf noch ältere Wurzeln, die in Ansichten von Aristoteles graben, wurde von Mario Crocco and Colin Dougall auf die Theorie der Autopoiesie hingewiesen, die von den Neurobiologen Maturana und Varela aufgestellt wurde. Diese wurden in einer Kultur geboren, die durch vier Jahrhunderte aristotelischer und jesuitischer Schulung geprägt war. So weit auf das Studium solcher Wurzeln hat der gegenwärtige Schreiber sein Forschungs-Programm jedoch noch nicht fortgesetzt. Die Theorie der Autopoiesie, welche hauptsächlich das konstruktivistische Paradigma koordiniert und ergänzt, illustriert die Auswirkungen einer Wissenschaftstheorie v.a. in Anbetracht der Theorie der Selbst-Organisation.

Nach diesen Schritten grundlegender wissenschaftlicher Reflexion ist es möglich, die Verdienste einer durch den Konstruktivismus inspirierten Pädagogik und Didaktik zu diskutieren und einzuschätzen: Im Szenario des Angekommen-Seins, kann das Ergebnis einer konstruktivistischen Pädagogik systematisch vom theoretischen Rahmenwerk abgeleitet werden. Viele Folgen des Konstruktivismus sind heutzutage weit verbreitet in der akademischen Gesellschaft, die sich mit Pädagogik und Didaktik befasst. Das Hauptmerkmal konstruktivistischer Pädagogik und Didaktik ist das Augenmerk auf den Schüler und Studenten. Autopoietisch geschlossene und strukturselektiv agierende Systeme sind nur zum Agieren fähig. Deshalb gilt z.B. Gruppenarbeit heute als probates Mittel für den schulischen Unterricht.

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RESUMEN: Este trabajo comienza por la tesis de que grandes porciones de la teoría constructivista hallaron cálida acogida en el discurso pedagógico-didáctico contemporáneo. Son ejemplo de ello las recientes reformas en las políticas públicas del sector educación en Alemania. Pero las teorías constructivistas no siempre se distinguen fácilmente como tales, tal vez porque a menudo, cuando un autor se refiere abiertamente al constructivismo, sus ideas son rebajadas. Se debe esto a que, en general, la historia de la ciencia y la teoría de la ciencia todavía no han pensado con suficiente profundidad el constructivismo y la autopoiesis. Otra dificultad que se añade consiste en que la radicalidad del constructivismo con frecuencia evoca la idea de arbitrariedad.

El presente ensayo trata de cubrir ese hueco del discurso científico y contribuir a la sistematización científica, histórico-genética, de paradigmas nocionales. Como raíz y fuente ideológica de la teoría constructivista se identifica al idealismo alemán; por ejemplo, la obra de Johann Gottlieb Fichte y Friedrich W. J. Schelling; más tarde, Schmidt y von Glasersfeld aportarían mayores especificaciones. Raíces aún más antiguas, arraigadas en conceptos de Aristotéles, han sido señaladas por Mario Crocco y Colin Dougall para la teoría de la autopoiesis compuesta por los neurobiólogos Maturana y Varela, nacidos en una cultura en gran parte moldeada por cuatro siglos de enseñanza aristotélica jesuítica; el presente autor, empero, hasta ahora no ha extendido su programa de investigación hasta el estudio de esas raíces. La teoría de la autopoiesis, que entronca, articula y complementa el paradigma constructivista, ilustra las implicaciones de una teoría de la ciencia sobre la teoría de la auto-organización.

Tras esas etapas de reflexión científica, de carácter fundamental, se hace posible analizar y evaluar los méritos de una pedagogía y una didáctica inspiradas en el constructivismo. En efecto, desde tal perspectiva, las consecuencias de la pedagogía constructivista pueden deducirse sistemáticamente del marco teórico. En nuestros días muchas secuelas del constructivismo se expandieron ampliamente a través de la comunidad académica vinculada a la pedagogía y didáctica. El rasgo prominente de la pedagogía y didáctica constructivistas es el foco que pone en el estudiante. Los estudiantes son considerados sistemas autopoieticamente cerrados y sistemas que obran de modo estructural-selectivo, sólo capaces de actuar en base a su propia ocurrencia e incapaces de responder a las incitaciones externas. Por ello el medio ideal de la educación exitosa es visto en la autoinstrucción y el trabajo en grupo o entre asociados.

1. Introduction

The author has already pointed out that a reflection in History of Science, about the philosophical and paradigmatic background of self-organisation theories, reveals that German idealism – mainly, Fichte's ideas – generated the modern self-organisation-theories and, on the way, the constructivism, which derives from it.[1] This essay builds on this fundamental insight, also expounded elsewhere[2], and asks here after its consequences in the area of pedagogy and the didactic disciplines. As regards the discussion details, the present exposition follows a middle course since, for the said purpose, the analysis of the conceptual historical grounds of modern constructivist pedagogy can no longer be carried out so elaborately as it was previously done. Nevertheless, it is necessary to illustrate at least the essential part of that argumentative reasoning, before bringing in the effects on the constructivist pedagogy and didactic.

At constructivism, an interdisciplinary paradigm is dealt with. The following disciplines, inter alia, make use of theories from the constructivistic stock:

v Biology

v Philosophy

v Political Science

v Sociology

v Discourse Analysis

v Literary Studies

v Systems Theory

v Chemistry

v Physics

v Medicine

v Neurophysiology

This enumeration claims no completeness and, as a further discipline, pedagogy has to be named. In pedagogy the constructivist body of thought finds multiple uses. Essential parts of the spreading reforms in education and education planning are based on the constructivist body of thought. The student is to gain competences, rather than acquiring cognoscitive curricular contents forwarded by the teacher; or, in other words, improvement in learning primarily represent improvements in competences.[3] Constructivist approaches are also found in the control of the educative system: schools get a higher level of autonomy. Any efforts toward controlling, specially those by the Ministry or other administrative bodies, can be no more than controlling the progress of self-controlling.

As it also occurs in other disciplines, the scepticism regarding constructivist theories is nevertheless extensive.[4] This results, inter alia, from the uninhibitedness and radicalism of the constructivist body of thought. Who embraces the cause of constructivism in most cases only communicates its conclusions. The historical correlations relating to concepts and problems become concealed, a suppression not seldom due, in point of fact, just to plain unawareness. The historical dimensions of science are rarely found in the pedagogical literature, and any diachronic overviews use to be – at most – just short descriptive notes.

As this article wishes being of help to moderate these limitations, it starts with a discussion in the context of history of science and history of ideas, in which German idealism is identified as the precursor of the constructivist body of thought. Then, as the system-theoretical biological model of autopoiesis, by Chilean neurobiologists Maturana and Varela, lends itself finely to science-theoretical reflections, this feature is tapped for presenting autopoiesis in regard to its numerous discursive applications. After that, so as to bring the present article to a close, the constructivist-pedagogical body of thought is plainly and most succinctly represented, undiscussed but with explicit references to the previous exposition. The expected upshot is that no longer the thus presented results of constructivist pedagogy and didactics might appear surprising, or even mind-boggling.

2. A reflection in history of science: idealism as the philosophical grounding of autopoiesis

The philosophical roots of radical constructivism and the "theory of autopoiesis" are to be looked for in German idealism, especially in Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. There the roots of the constructivist pedagogical discourse lie.

2.1 Kant's Copernican turn of transcendental philosophy

Kant’s philosophy runs under the label of Critical Idealism and functions as a precursor of German Idealism. Critical idealism subjects to a fundamental examination the cognitive processes going on in the cognizing subject. That means, Kant does not let the philosophical reason wander over the unknown quarters of our material world. He rather concentrates the attention on the mind's inner space.[5] Besides, the similarity of the secularist trends in idealism and autopoiesis has to be pointed out, too: both try to acquire an advanced explanatory power without taking resource of transcendental constructions.[6] In this very fashion Kant attempts to enlighten, by means of the (pure) mind, the things behind the perceptible.[7] The interest of Kant’s reasoning decant into three questions:

- what one could know (was man wissen könne)

- what one should do (was man tun solle), and

- what one is allowed to hope (was man hoffen dürfe).

Of these questions, the first one is speculative, the second practical, the third at once practical as well as theoretical[8]. In addition, one can make reference to Kant’s transcendental physics as a metaphysics of the meta-physics. And for Kant, meta-physics is the scientific cognition, when it is compelled to jump, by way of concepts, beyond the empirical experience. This comes to be the case as it pronouces itself about knowledge, about the world – or reality – in general; about morality, beauty, or history.[9] There the intellect draws up a picture of the world that appears, to it, as the actual reality, in the sense of what is objectively given. This activity of the subject brings about, as its result, the creation (of the world): "For we do not know nature but as the totality of appearances, i.e., of representations in us, and hence we can only derive the laws of its connexion from the principles of their connexion in us, that is from the conditions of their necessary union in consciousness, which constitutes the possibility of experience." [10] In his critique of the pure reason, Kant thus lays the foundations of an epistemological change of paradigm, by essaying to prove that we are not cognizant of the world as it is, but of the world as it seems to be so: simply as we recognize it. The recognizing mind is not an impression of the world, but the world is an impression of human mind.[11] Experience thus cannot be the showing itself, in our sensory intuition, of an essence existing independently of us, "but the conceptual and subjective schematizing of a spatial-temporal givenness." [12] It is the „pure sensory view as space and time" that "which makes the cognizance a priori possible, and this no more than for sensory realities." [13] Here the parallelism with the autopoiesis theory's cognitive autonomy is to become evident. It should be noted that, in this context, the sources of metaphysical knowledge can neither be of empirical origin, nor deduced from experiments.[14]

So the subject brings up, i.e. suscitates, the world. Whence it comes that this world is perceived in correspondence with the subject's structure, and only can be acted upon along with it. This corresponds to the autopoietical features of "structure determination" and "operational unity". [15] It ought to be critically protested, in this regard, that for Kant subjective cognition is not identical with a not-objective cognition, as the consciousness of each and every human being is structured in a way more or less similar. For that reason, the subjective cognition's meanings can be intersubjectively extrapolated, and shared. Therefore a distinction regarding the premises of the autopoiesis theory takes place, since in autopoiesis theory the living beings' organisation is identical but their structure is different.[16] This discrepancy is cleared up in Fichte. Kant asserts that the function of thinking turns up from an activity whose originator is the self-conscious subject. That is to say, the intellect draws up a world picture in a sovereign way. Facts arise from the activity of the subjectivity, in such a way that one can say that facts would be our creation.[17] It further is specified that there is a relationship between the object's structure and the attendant form of judgement; or, that what we call "objects" is nothing else but "that, whereupon we, with our accurate judgements, make reference to."."[18] In the vein of Aristotle's Prime Mover, which moves toward Itself (thereby shaping up the whole Nature, with its admirably harmonized motions) every other thing "autonomously", by way of the love for It that the very Prime Mover by itself inspires in every other thing's heart, likewise in Kant the appeal of the real things in themselves acts as raw matter on the spirit's cognitive power and a priori forms, and is shaped up by these. A priori means a possibility of universal application, as well as a transcendental stage – or plane – of sensory perception.[19] The acquisition of knowledge in this manner is a composite occurrence. It does not only consist in the cognitive apprehension of sensual impressions. Kant's articulation of rational and empirical components in the occurrence of each acquisition of knowledge concurs with the basic views of the "theory of autopoiesis", as both components, i.e. the own understanding as ratio and the world as empirical fact, are created by the own self.

2.2 Fichte’s constituting of the world by the subject

In current discussions, Kant is appreciated as a theorist of science. Nevertheless, it is reserved to Fichte (in contradistinction to Kant) the distinguishing trait of having put "the main emphasis, of the scientific acquisition of knowledge, on the deductive method" [20]. Whence Fichte demands that philosophy be established on some absolute, self-evident proposition, from which everything else could be deduced.[21] More emphatically even than Kant, Fichte puts the subject into the focal point. Is the human being free and independent, or only a product or manifestation of an alien force? [22] Fichte’s philosophical system can be understood as a praxis or system of action. The ego is identical to willing and knowing.[23] All heteronomy of the subject is denied, and it is highlighted the subject's own endeavour to encompass the prevailing infinity.[24] Fichte radicalizes Kant, as he rails against the doctrine of the "dogmatism" – until then ruling – whereby the human is the product of outer things and relationships. Fichte thinks: „I and my world are the product of my free activity" [25] He made the import of the spirit stronger, as "it produces a world out of the nothing, because only the I of the spirit exists" [26]. This yields an exact correspondence with the premises of the autopoiesis' axioms of cognitive autonomy, structural determination, and operational unity. In that connection these characteristic features can be clarified, and more concretely formulated, as that the subject brings up the world (as object), and the consistence of the object is totally dependent of the distinctively characterized, structured activity of the subject.

If the consciousness considers itself, and reflects on the preconditions of the own possibilities, it discovers the own ‘I’-condition or ego-hood (thesis), which is thinkable only in connection with a ‘Non-I’ (antithesis, as this that the world can become). Both steps are themselves carried out subject-immanently, i.e. inside of the subject, thus coming along to abolish the contradiction, into the unity of the higher ego (synthesis). This is also the Absolute Ego.[27] One may not equate the Absolute Ego with the individual, because it is the individual who has to be deduced from the Absolute Ego.[28] This Fichte pointedly formulates, by declaring that the (dividable) Ego sets up itself, which again sets up, against itself, a dividable non-Ego: „The striving of the I can't be set without setting a counter-striving by the non-I; for, the striving of the first comes from causality, but hasn’t causality; and that it hasn’t got any causality, is why it hasn’t got its foundation from itself, because otherwise the same striving wouldn’t be a striving, but nothing." [29] The subject's setting and countersetting work flows into a (dialectical) synthesis of subject and object as Ego and Non-Ego, whereby both the knowledge owned by the Ego, as well as its reflection, consist of a permanent setting-countersetting dialectic.[30] I c